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Wu: Bryan v. McPherson

CASE SUMMARY
“WHEN CAN I TASE HIM, BRO?”:
BRYAN V. MCPHERSON AND THE
PROPRIETY OF POLICE
USE OF TASERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the United States, over 11,500 law enforcement agencies
are testing or using Tasers1 and other similar electric devices.2 A
Taser’s “non-lethal” nature finds use when a firearm would not be
prudent or reasonable but a simple verbal command would not
suffice. Despite a Taser’s apparent utility, news headlines
continue to depict police officers across the country using Tasers
inappropriately and unreasonably. For instance, in March 2009, a
sixteen-year-old boy died after Detroit police used a Taser on him
when the boy fled and resisted arrest after a routine traffic stop.3
In June 2009, a police officer in Travis County, Texas, used a
Taser on a seventy-two-year-old great-grandmother during a
traffic stop.4 In November 2009, a police officer in Ozark,

1

A Taser is a handheld electrical device that can deliver an electric shock to an
individual for the purpose of immobilizing the person.
2
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, “LESS THAN LETHAL?” THE USE OF STUN WEAPONS IN US
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
1
(2008),
available
at
http://www.amnesty.ca/amnestynews/upload/AMR510102008.pdf; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, STUDY OF DEATHS FOLLOWING ELECTRO MUSCULAR
DISRUPTION:
INTERIM
REPORT
1
(June
2008),
available
at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/222981.pdf.
3
Abbie Boudreau & Scott Bronstein, “No Excuse” for Teen’s Taser Death, Mother
Says, CNN, May 28, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/05/28/michigan.taser.death.
4
J.D. Tuccille, Texas Cop Tasers Great-Grandmother, CIVIL LIBERTIES EXAMINER,
June 2, 2009, http://www.examiner.com/x-536-Civil-Liberties-Examiner~y2009m6d2-Texascop-Tasers-greatgrandmother.
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Arkansas, used a Taser on a ten-year-old girl after she became
unruly, combative, and eventually kicked the officer in the groin.5
Perhaps the most well-known Taser incident — and the
source of the infamous one-liner, “Don’t Tase Me, Bro!” — is the
story of Andrew Meyer. On September 17, 2007, University of
Florida student Andrew Meyer attended an on-campus speech
given by Massachusetts Senator John Kerry.6 Meyer was given
permission to pose a question to Senator Kerry.7 Meyer’s inquiry
turned into three questions.8 After his series of questions, but
before Senator Kerry could answer, two police officers
approached Meyer from behind and attempted to escort him out
the door.9
Wondering why he was being arrested, Meyer
exclaimed, “Excuse me, what are you arresting me for?”10 When
another officer appeared on the scene, the three officers moved
Meyer toward the back of the auditorium.11
At the back of the auditorium, Meyer simultaneously
attempted to move away from one of the officers who had him by
the arms and proclaimed, “Get away from me!”12 At this point, the
group of officers pinned Meyer to the ground by the aisle.13 A few
moments later, when Meyer noticed one officer take out a Taser,
he screamed, “Don’t Tase me, bro! Don’t Tase me! I didn’t do
anything!”14 One of the officers used the Taser on Meyer, and
Meyer was then escorted out of the auditorium and arrested for
resisting a police officer and disturbing the peace.15 Meyer spent
5

10-Year-Old Is Tasered by Officer in Arkansas, MSNBC, Nov. 18, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34014497/ns/us_news-life.
6
Monica Hesse, Aiming to Agitate, Florida Student Got a Shock, WASH. POST, Sept.
19,
2007,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/09/18/AR2007091802115.html; UF Student Tasered at Kerry
Forum (New, Complete), YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r7Qef8oPmag (last
visited Jan. 6, 2010).
7
Hesse, supra note 6; UF Student Tasered at Kerry Forum (New, Complete), supra
note 6.
8
Meyer asked Senator Kerry 1) why he had conceded the 2004 presidential race,
2) why President Bush had not been impeached, and 3) whether he was a member of Yale
secret society Skull & Bones. Hesse, supra note 6; UF Student Tasered at Kerry Forum
(New, Complete), supra note 6.
9
Hesse, supra note 6; UF Student Tasered at Kerry Forum (New, Complete), supra
note 6.
10
Hesse, supra note 6.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Hesse, supra note 6; UF Student Tasered at Kerry Forum (New, Complete), supra
note 6.
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the night in city jail and was released the following morning.16
Meyer later apologized, and the charges against him were
dropped.17
This incident is illustrative of the type of heavy-handed use of
Tasers by police officers that has raised questions about
excessive use of force and police immunity from lawsuits in Taser
incidents. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit directly
addressed these issues at the end of 2009 in Bryan v.
McPherson.18
In Bryan, the Ninth Circuit set clear parameters as to when
police officers can and cannot use Tasers and other similar
electronic devices.19 The court held that the use of the Taser by
Officer Brian McPherson upon Carl Bryan was an “intermediate
quantum of force,”20 and this level of force can be justified only by
strong governmental interests.21 The Ninth Circuit held that, in this
case, the governmental interest was only minimal.22 Therefore,
accepting Bryan’s allegations as true for purposes of Officer
McPherson’s motion for summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the use of the Taser against Bryan was
unreasonable and he could proceed with his legal action against
the police officer.23
This Case Summary begins by detailing the factual and
procedural history of Bryan. Next, it outlines the “reasonable use
of force” analysis of the Ninth Circuit as applied to Tasers. Finally,
it concludes by briefly discussing the broad implications of Bryan,
both for law enforcement and for every individual who may
someday find himself or herself facing a police officer armed with
a Taser.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the summer of 2005, twenty-one-year-old Carl Bryan
planned to drive his brother across Southern California, from

16
17

Hesse, supra note 6.
“Don’t Tase Me, Bro” Student Won’t Be Charged, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 30,

2007.
18

Bryan v. McPherson, 590 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id.
20
The Ninth Circuit defined “quantum of force” as the type and amount of force
used. Bryan, 590 F.3d at 772.
21
Id. at 774.
22
Id. at 780.
23
Id. at 781.
19
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Camarillo to Coronado.24
However, his cousin’s girlfriend
accidentally took Bryan’s car keys with her to Los Angeles.25 So,
before Bryan could begin his trip to Coronado, he had to make an
early morning trek to Los Angeles to get the keys back.26 Once
Bryan obtained his car keys, he headed toward Coronado.27
While on Interstate 405, Bryan was stopped by the California
Highway Patrol (CHP) for speeding, and he was issued a
speeding ticket.28 This would not be Bryan’s only encounter with
law enforcement that day.
At approximately 7:30 a.m., Bryan’s vehicle crossed the
Coronado Bridge.29 Officer McPherson of the Coronado Police
Department was stationed at a nearby intersection to enforce
seatbelt usage.30 Officer McPherson stepped in front of Bryan’s
vehicle and signaled for the vehicle to stop.31 According to the
record, Bryan forgot to put on his seatbelt after the earlier incident
with the CHP.32 When Bryan realized why he had been stopped
by Officer McPherson, he became increasingly angry with
himself.33 Due to his emotional state, Bryan did not answer Officer
McPherson’s question as to whether Bryan knew why he had
been stopped.34
Officer McPherson then requested Bryan to turn down his
radio and pull his vehicle to the curb.35 Bryan complied with both
of the requests.36 Bryan’s anger continued to increase and he hit
his steering wheel and yelled several expletives to himself.37
Once Bryan pulled his car to the curb and placed it in park, he
stepped out of his vehicle.38 Once outside the vehicle, Bryan was
approximately twenty to twenty-five feet away from Officer

24

Id. at 770.
Id. The drive from Camarillo to Los Angeles is approximately fifty-three miles. See
http://maps.google.com (type in “Camarillo to Los Angeles, California” and click on “Search
Maps”) (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
26
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 770.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 771.
29
Id.
30
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 771.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 771.
37
Id.
38
Id.
25
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McPherson, and he continued to yell expletives and gibberish at
himself while hitting his thighs.39 Officer McPherson testified that
he told Bryan to remain in his car, but Bryan testified that he did
not hear any such command.40 There was also a dispute as to
whether Bryan moved toward the officer. Officer McPherson
testified that Bryan took “one step” toward him, while Bryan
testified that he did not; the physical evidence supported Bryan’s
testimony in this point.41 However, it was undisputed that Bryan
did not verbally threaten Officer McPherson and was not
attempting to flee.42
Then, without any warning, Officer McPherson shot Bryan
with his Model X2643 Taser gun.44 A Taser probe was embedded
in Bryan’s upper left arm, and the electrical current immobilized
him.45 Bryan fell face first into the ground and fractured four
teeth.46 The fall also caused several facial contusions.47
Bryan was arrested after being taken to the hospital for
treatment.48 Bryan was charged with violating California Penal
Code section 148 for resisting and opposing an officer in the
performance of his duties.49 But after a trial resulted in a hung
jury, the state dismissed all charges against Bryan.50

Bryan sued Officer McPherson, the Coronado Police
Department, the police chief, and the City of Coronado for
excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,51 assault and
39

Id.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 771.
43
Model X26 is manufactured and sold by Taser International. See TASER X26,
http://taser.com/products/law/Pages/TASERX26.aspx (last visited Jan. 6th, 2010).
44
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 771.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 771.
48
Id.
49
Id. n.1.
50
Id.
51
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides as follows:
40

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by
the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
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battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of
California Civil Code section 52.1,52 failure to train, and other
related causes of action.53 The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California54 granted summary judgment55 to
the City of Coronado and the Coronado Police Department on the
basis of qualified immunity.56
However, the district court
determined that Officer McPherson was not entitled to qualified
immunity.57 The district court further found that a reasonable jury
could find for Bryan and that a reasonable officer would have
known that using the Taser on Bryan would cause pain from the
electrical current and cause the fall onto the asphalt.58 The district
court concluded that it was clear to a reasonable officer that using
a Taser on Bryan was unlawful.59
Officer McPherson appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that
he was entitled to qualified immunity because the “use of one
single, properly-administered deployment of a non-deadly [T]aser
to subdue a person behaving as violently and irrationally as Bryan
was after Bryan repeatedly declined to follow orders is, as a
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Westlaw 2010).
52
California Civil Code section 52.1(a) provides as follows:
If a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threats,
intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion,
with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the
Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney General, or any district attorney or city
attorney may bring a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief
in the name of the people of the State of California, in order to protect the peaceable
exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured. An action brought by the
Attorney General, any district attorney, or any city attorney may also seek a civil
penalty of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000). If this civil penalty is requested, it
shall be assessed individually against each person who is determined to have
violated this section and the penalty shall be awarded to each individual whose
rights under this section are determined to have been violated.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1(a) (Westlaw 2010).
53
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 771.
54
Bryan v. McPherson, 3:06-CV-01487-LAB (S.D. Cal. 2008).
55
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
56
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 771.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 772.
59
Id.
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matter of law, reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.”60 Accordingly, Officer McPherson
requested that the Ninth Circuit reverse the district court’s denial
of his motion for summary judgment.61
“Qualified immunity” is a special immunity that protects
governmental officers from a lawsuit, as distinguished from a
defense only to liability.62 But qualified immunity is available only
if the governmental officer’s conduct did not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.63 The Supreme Court has stated that
“[q]ualified immunity balances two important interests–the need to
hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment,
distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
reasonably.”64 The Court went on to hold that “[t]he protection of
qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government
official’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake
based on mixed questions of law and fact.”65
For an officer to receive qualified immunity, a court must first
“decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged make out a
violation of a constitutional right.”66 Then, “if the plaintiff has
satisfied this first step, the court must decide whether the right at
issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged
misconduct.”67 If the official was acting within the scope of his or
her discretionary authority, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to
show that the grant of qualified immunity is inappropriate.68 A
court must grant qualified immunity to a law enforcement officer
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the facts, when viewed in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish a constitutional
violation, and that the illegality of the officer’s actions was “clearly
established” at the time of the incident.69
60

Opening Brief of Appellants at 1, Bryan v. McPherson, 590 F.3d 767 (9th Cir.
2009) (No. 08-55622), 2008 WL 5410908.
61
Id.
62
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009); Mattos v. Agarano, 590 F.3d
1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009).
63
Callahan, 129 S. Ct. at 815.
64
Id.
65
Callahan, 129 S. Ct. at 815.
66
Callahan, 129 S. Ct. at 815-16.
67
Id. at 816.
68
Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 905 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Callahan, 129 S. Ct.
808, 808).
69
Id. (citing Callahan, 129 S. Ct. at 815-16, 818).
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III. NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit’s standard of review of a district court’s
denial of qualified immunity is de novo.70 In evaluating the denial
of qualified immunity by the district court, the court in Bryan
organized its analysis around two distinct questions.71 First, the
court, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Bryan as the
nonmoving party, had to determine whether Officer McPherson
employed constitutionally excessive force upon Bryan.72 If there
was a constitutional violation, the second question was whether
Officer McPherson violated Bryan’s clearly established rights.73
To affirm the denial of summary judgment, the appellate court had
to answer both questions affirmatively.74

A.

WHETHER OFFICER MCPHERSON EMPLOYED
CONSTITUTIONALLY EXCESSIVE FORCE

The first question is governed by the 1989 Supreme Court
case Graham v. Connor.75 Graham held that a citizen’s claim that
law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of
making a seizure of the person is to be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.76 The Court
70

Bryan v. McPherson, 590 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id.
72
Id.
73
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 772. For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its
“contours must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he
is doing violates that right.” al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 964 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)).
74
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 772.
75
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
76
The facts of Graham are as follows:
71

On November 12, 1984, Graham, a diabetic, experienced an insulin reaction. He
asked his friend to drive him to a convenience store so he could purchase juice in an
attempt to counteract the reaction. When Graham entered the store, he saw a line
at the checkout, so he decided to leave the store and ask his friend to drive him to a
friend’s house instead. Officer Connor of Charlotte, North Carolina, observed
Graham enter and leave the store in a hasty manner. Officer Connor became
suspicious that something was amiss and followed Graham and his friend’s car. At
about half a mile from the store, the officer made an investigative stop. Graham
tried to explain that he had an insulin reaction, but the officer ordered the two people
in the car to wait while he tried to find out what, if anything, happened at the
convenience store. While Officer Connor returned to the patrol car to call for
backup, Graham got out of the car, ran around the car twice, and finally sat down on
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identified a balancing test between the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests and the
countervailing governmental interests at stake.77
Since the critical determination is whether the amount of force
used in a particular seizure was “reasonable” under Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the analysis requires careful attention
to the facts and circumstances of the case.78 Graham noted that,
in analyzing the governmental interest involved, a court should
consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,
and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.”79 Graham further held that the “reasonableness”
of the use of force must be “judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision
of hindsight.”80 Hindsight is not relevant to the analysis because
police officers are “often forced to make split-second judgments–in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving–
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.”81 Finally, the objectiveness of the analysis disregards
the police officer’s underlying intent or motivation.82
1.

Nature and Quality of the Intrusion
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of the first question by
the curb, where he subsequently passed out for a brief moment. When backup
arrived, one of the officers rolled Graham over on the sidewalk and cuffed his hands
tightly behind his back, ignoring the friend’s plea to get Graham some sugar. The
officers did not believe the friend and assumed Graham was drunk. The officers
lifted Graham from the ground and placed him on the hood of a patrol vehicle.
Graham regained consciousness and asked one of the officers to check his back
pocket for a diabetic decal. The officer ignored his request, told Graham to “shut
up,” and shoved Graham’s face onto the hood of the car. Four officers grabbed
Graham and threw him head first into the patrol car. A friend tried to bring Graham
some orange juice in the vehicle, but the officers refused to allow Graham to drink it.
Finally, when Officer Connor received a report that Graham had done nothing wrong
at the convenience store, the officers drove Graham home and released him.
Graham sustained a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and an
injured shoulder. He also claimed to have developed a loud ringing in his right ear.
Graham subsequently sued the individual officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983.

Graham, 490 U.S. at 388-90.
77
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
82
Id.
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looking at the quantum of force Officer McPherson used on
Bryan.83
Officer McPherson used the Coronado Police
Department-issued Taser X26.84 This model uses compressed
nitrogen to propel a pair of electrical dart-like probes toward the
person.85 The probes are made of aluminum, and the tips of the
probes are stainless-steel barbs.86 The probes are connected to
the firing unit by insulated wires.87 The probes travel at a rate of
about 160 feet per second.88
Tasers and stun-guns are considered “non-lethal.”89 As the
quantum of force of “non-lethal” devices varies depending on the
type of instrument used, the court compared and contrasted
Tasers to other non-lethal uses of force.90 For example, pepper
spray affects only the target’s eyes or respiratory system.91 The
pain caused by pepper spray is “intense . . . [and causes] an
involuntary closing of the eyes, a gagging reflex, and temporary
paralysis of the larynx.”92 In contrast, the court in Bryan noted that
the Taser X26 delivers a far more intense, body-wide, and
immediate pain.93 Further, a Taser will likely cause secondary
pain when the target suddenly cannot control his or her muscles,
resulting in a “sudden and uncontrolled fall.”94
When Taser probes hit a person, the firing unit delivers a
1200-volt, low-ampere electrical charge through the wires to the
probes and into the person’s muscles.95 The electrical current
paralyzes the person’s central nervous system and muscles
throughout the body.96 The target becomes “limp and helpless.”97
In addition, the target person experiences an “excruciating pain
that radiates throughout the body.”98
Bryan testified to the paralysis and the intense pain he
83

Id.
Id.
85
Bryan v. McPherson, 590 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2009).
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 773.
90
Id. at 774.
91
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 774.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 773.
96
Id.
97
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 773.
98
Id.
84
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experienced.99 Further, when the Taser struck Bryan, he lost
muscular control and fell face first onto the pavement.100 He
shattered his front four teeth and had several facial abrasions.101
Also, one of the barbed probes remained in his body and required
removal by a scalpel.102 Based on these facts, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the Taser X26 and similar electric devices
constitute an “intermediate or medium, though not insignificant,
quantum of force.”103
2.

Governmental Interest in the Use of Force

After holding that a Taser constituted an intermediate
quantum of force, the next step in the Ninth Circuit’s analysis was
to determine the government’s interest in the use of that level of
force. As previously stated, a court should use the Graham
factors when determining whether the government’s interest
justifies the use of force. The Graham factors are: a) the severity
of the crime at issue, b) whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and c) whether he or
she is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.104 The Ninth Circuit cautioned, however, that the three
Graham factors are not exclusive.105 Instead, this analysis must
encompass the totality of the circumstances of each case and
take into account factors that might not have been listed in
Graham.106
a. The Severity of the Crime at Issue
Officer McPherson originally stopped Bryan for a seatbelt
violation, a traffic infraction punishable by a fine.107 The court
stated the general rule that “traffic violations generally will not
support the use of a significant level of force.”108 But during the
99

Id.
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 774.
104
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 775.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 777.
108
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 777; Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009).
Although the Ninth Circuit did not define what is a “significant level of force,” one can posit
that in this context, the Ninth Circuit is saying that normally, a routine traffic stop will not
100
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traffic stop, Officer McPherson also believed that Bryan had
potentially committed three misdemeanors: resisting a police
officer,109 failure to comply with a lawful order,110 and being under
the influence of a controlled substance.111 However, the court
concluded that, since none of these three misdemeanors was
inherently dangerous, there was no substantial governmental
interest in effectuating Bryan’s arrest through the use of
intermediate force.112
b. Whether the Suspect Poses an Immediate Threat to the Safety
of the Officers or Others
The most important Graham factor is whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.113
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that Bryan’s
behavior was unusual, that Bryan appeared, and in fact was,
unarmed, and that Bryan was shouting expletives and gibberish to
himself.114 However, Bryan never directed a physical or verbal
threat to Officer McPherson.115 At the time of the Taser incident,
Bryan was approximately twenty feet away from the officer, and
Bryan contended he did not advance toward Officer
present a situation where the police officer would need to use a level of force to have the
person comply with the officer’s commands.
109
California Penal Code section 148(a)(1) provides as follows:
Every person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public officer, peace
officer, or an emergency medical technician, as defined in Division 2.5 (commencing
with Section 1797) of the Health and Safety Code, in the discharge or attempt to
discharge any duty of his or her office or employment, when no other punishment is
prescribed, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000),
or by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by both that fine and
imprisonment.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 148(a)(1) (Westlaw 2010).
110
California Vehicle Code section 2800(a) provides as follows:
It is unlawful to willfully fail or refuse to comply with a lawful order, signal, or direction
of a peace officer, as defined in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 830) of Title
3 of Part 2 of the Penal Code, when that peace officer is in uniform and is performing
duties pursuant to any of the provisions of this code, or to refuse to submit to a
lawful inspection pursuant to this code.
CAL. VEH. CODE § 2800(a) (Westlaw 2010).
111
California Health & Safety Code section 11550(a) provides as follows: “No person
shall use, or be under the influence of any controlled substance . . . .” CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11550(a) (Westlaw 2010).
112
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 777.
113
Id. at 775.
114
Id.
115
Id.
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McPherson.116 The Ninth Circuit concluded that, even if Bryan
had taken a step toward Officer McPherson, an intermediate level
of force would not have been justified, because Bryan would still
have been about nineteen feet away from the officer.117
Further, when Officer McPherson confronted Bryan, he had
un-holstered and charged his Taser X26, thereby readying himself
for an immediate response to any changes in the
circumstances.118 Additionally, there was evidence that Bryan
was actually facing away from Officer McPherson when the officer
shot Bryan with the Taser.119 The court noted that one of the
electrical probes was lodged in the side of Bryan’s arms rather
than in his chest, indicating that Bryan was not directly facing
Officer McPherson.120 Furthermore, the blood on the pavement
indicated that Bryan fell face-first away from Officer McPherson.121
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, not only did Bryan
appear to be no threat to Officer McPherson, but Bryan’s behavior
did not pose a threat to anyone else because there were no
nearby pedestrians.122
The Ninth Circuit distinguished the circumstances in Bryan
from those facing the officer in the Eleventh Circuit in Draper v.
Reynolds.123 In Draper, an officer pulled over the defendant’s
vehicle for an alleged tag light violation.124 The officer requested
four times that the defendant provide specific documents pursuant
to a traffic stop.125 However, the defendant ignored all four
requests and became increasingly belligerent.126 It was only after
the fifth request was ignored by the “threatening” defendant that
the officer concluded he had to discharge his Taser to protect
himself and bring the defendant under control.127

116

Bryan, 590 F.3d at 775.
Id. at 776.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 776 n.10.
123
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 776; Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2004).
124
Reynolds, 369 F.3d at 1273.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
117
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c. Whether the Suspect is Actively Resisting Arrest or Attempting
To Evade Arrest by Flight
The Ninth Circuit began the analysis of the third factor by
cautioning that resistance is usually not purely passive or purely
active.128 The court stated that an example of “passive resistance”
was when protestors remained seated and ignored police orders
to move.129 In comparison, an example of “active resistance” was
when an arrestee swung a belt at an officer and “strenuously
resist[ed]” as the police attempted to handcuff the individual.130
But the court noted that, even in a situation in which an individual
is purely passive in resistance, the use of some force upon that
individual might be justified if the factual circumstances depict
bellicosity toward the officer rising to the level of a threat.131
Here, the court found Bryan’s behavior was not purely
passive.132 Bryan shouted expletives at himself and hit his thighs
in apparent frustration with how his day had started.133 However,
Bryan complied with all of Officer McPherson’s commands, except
the one to remain in the vehicle, which Bryan claimed he did not
hear.134 The Ninth Circuit concluded that, although Bryan’s
behavior was “bizarre,” his actions were not “bellicose” and were
far from indicative of an intention to engage in an active struggle
with the officer.135 Since the reviewing court must view the facts in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that Bryan’s conduct was not enough to constitute
resistance.136
d. Two Additional Considerations Beyond the Graham Factors
Aside from the three Graham factors, the Ninth Circuit
analyzed two additional factors that supported its conclusion that
the officer’s use of force was unreasonable.137 The first was
Officer McPherson’s failure to warn Bryan that he would use a

128

Bryan v. McPherson, 590 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. (citing Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 805 (9th Cir. 1994)).
130
Id. (citing Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 776 (7th Cir. 2005)).
131
Id. at 779.
132
Id. at 778.
133
Id.
134
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 779.
135
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 779.
136
Id.
137
Id.
129
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Taser if Bryan did not remain in the car.138 The court stated that
there appeared to have been ample time for the officer to give
such a warning if the officer had intended to do so.139
Second, the Ninth Circuit noted that police officers are
required to consider alternative tactics to effectuate an arrest.140
The alternative tactic the Ninth Circuit concluded Officer
McPherson should have considered was the deployment of
additional officers to control Bryan.141 The court found that Officer
McPherson knew other officers would arrive on the scene and that
the presence of these additional officers would likely have
transformed the situation into one that would not require the use of
a Taser.142 These two additional considerations significantly
factored into the court’s Graham analysis.143 All five factors led
the Ninth Circuit to hold that the government had, at best, a
minimal interest in the use of force against Bryan.144
3.

Balancing the Competing Interests

Once the court determined the level of force in the use of the
Taser and the government’s interest in that use of force, the final
step was to balance these two competing interests. The court
noted that, although Bryan’s behaviors were unusual, he never
attempted to flee.145 He was unarmed.146 He stood by his vehicle
about twenty feet away from the officer.147 He never advanced
toward the officer, and evidence indicated that Bryan faced away
from the officer.148 Bryan was simply not an immediate threat to
anyone.149
In addition, the court noted that Officer McPherson had his
Taser charged and ready but he gave no warning to Bryan that he
was going to fire his Taser for failure to comply with orders.150
138

Id.
Id. at 780.
140
Although this is a factor, it is not a challenge to the well-settled principle that police
officers need not employ the least-intrusive degree of force possible. Id. at 780 n.15.
141
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 780.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 780.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 780.
139
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Further, Officer McPherson failed to consider the alternative tactic
of waiting for backup before engaging Bryan.151 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that the intermediate force use by Officer McPherson
upon Bryan was excessive compared to the governmental
interests at stake.152
Even though the court in Bryan recognized the realities police
officers face when confronting real situations, and acknowledged
that those situations can often be tense, unpredictable, and
require near-split-second decisions, it noted that this alone does
not give officers unchecked authority to use force.153 The court
underscored that the relevant circumstances must be considered
objectively, rather than from the officer’s subjective point of view,
in performing such an analysis.154
B.

DID OFFICER MCPHERSON VIOLATE BRYAN’S CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED RIGHTS?

After Bryan concluded that Officer McPherson used
constitutionally excessive force, the court next addressed the
second question of whether “at the time of the current incident . . .
Officer McPherson could have reasonably believed his use of the
[T]aser against Bryan was constitutional.”155
Here, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the facts of the case to
illustrate that Officer McPherson should have known that the use
of intermediate force was unjustified.156 The offense was a minor
one.157 There was no reason to believe Bryan was armed or
dangerous.158 Bryan was twenty feet away, and he did not
confront or taunt Officer McPherson.159 Further, there was
evidence that Bryan was not even facing Officer McPherson when
Bryan was shot with the Taser.160 Therefore, the court concluded
that Officer McPherson’s use of an intermediate amount of force
against Bryan did not constitute a reasonable mistake of either

151

Id. at 781.
Id.
153
Id. at 780.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 781.
159
Id.
160
Id.
152
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fact or law that would have entitled him to qualified immunity.161
Consequently, based on the intermediate level of force from the
Taser and the minimal governmental interest in using the Taser,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.162
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
The Bryan court synthesized several district-court rulings that
Tasers constituted “significant force”163 and labeled that force as
an intermediate quantum of force.164 The court proceeded to
weave that level of force into an application of the general
principle of excessive-force analysis: “[t]he force which was
applied must be balanced against the need for that force: it is the
need for force which is at the heart of the Graham factors.”165
Although courts will now have to engage in a case-by-case
determination of whether particular instances of Taser usage are
improper and whether officers using Tasers are entitled to
qualified immunity, Bryan makes clear that there are several
situations where police use of a Taser is likely to be
unconstitutional. First, although Bryan dealt with a specific Taser
Model, the X26, the Ninth Circuit stated its holding in broad terms
applicable to “all controlled electric devices that cause similar
physiological effects.”166 However, the officer used the “dart
mode” of the Taser and fired the electrical darts at Bryan rather
than using the less intense “stun mode.”167 Bryan left open the
question whether the stun mode of a Taser or other similar electric
device would be considered an intermediate quantum of force.168
161

Id. at 782.
Id.
163
See Sanders v. City of Fresno, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1168 (E.D. Cal. 2008);
Beaver v. City of Fed. Way, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
164
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 775.
165
Headwaters Forest Def. v. County of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir.
2002) (quoting Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 976 (9th Cir. 1997)).
166
Bryan, 590 F.3d at 772 n.2.
167
Id. at 772-73.
168
The Ninth Circuit recently decided another Taser case, Brooks v. City of Seattle,
599 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit distinguished the stun-mode use of the
Taser in Brooks with the dart-mode use of the Taser in Bryan, stating that there are
“markedly different physiological effects.” Id. at 1027. The majority concluded that the stunmode use of the Taser is less than an intermediate quantum of force. Id. at 1028. But
Circuit Judge Marsha Berzon filed a strong dissent, noting that in the Eighth Circuit, a
single application of the drive-stun mode constituted excessive force. Id. at 1037. Judge
Berzon also noted that although the Eighth Circuit “explained the difference between the
162
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Second, Bryan indicates that minor offenses such as
infractions or even nonviolent misdemeanors will not likely serve
as proper basis for Taser usage.169 Third, bizarre but nonthreatening outbursts, such as Bryan’s profanity and the hitting of
his thighs, likely will not by themselves justify the use of a
Taser.170 Finally, police will not likely be able to use Tasers on
non-resisting individuals.171
In light of the recent media attention to police officers’ use of
excessive Taser force, this decision should effectively set up strict
guidelines for when police may use Tasers. Now that Tasers are
clearly considered an intermediate quantum of force within the
Ninth Circuit, their use can be justified only by a strong
governmental interest.
For cities within the Ninth Circuit’s
jurisdiction with Taser policies already in place, Bryan and its
progeny will likely compel a wholesale review of those policies.
For a city such as San Francisco, which does not currently have a
Taser usage policy,172 it will need to shape its policy within the
parameters established by Bryan. In addition, law-enforcement
agencies will likely provide more training to officers on the proper
use of Tasers to help reduce the number of Taser-related injuries
and fatalities and to minimize government and individual officer
liabilities.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Bryan, the Ninth Circuit made clear that the use of a Taser
presents an intermediate use of force that is not justified unless
there is a strong governmental interest at stake.
The
circumstances of this case indicated that, although Bryan was
acting in a bizarre manner, he was not a threat to Officer
McPherson or anyone else, and the intermediate use of force of
the Taser was unconstitutionally excessive. Recent negative
media attention related to law enforcement’s improper use of
Tasers has brought to light the tragic effect on victims, the costs to
dart and drive-stun modes, the distinction played no role in the court’s excessive force
analysis.” Id. (Berzon, J., dissenting) (citing to Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491
(8th Cir. 2009)). This “split” within the Ninth Circuit could lead to an en banc review of the
Ninth Circuit’s excessive-force analysis as applied to the various uses of a Taser.
169
See Bryan, 590 F.3d at 777.
170
See Id. at 776.
171
See Id. at 779.
172
Jaxon Van Derbeken, Gascón Presses Case for Tasers, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 25,
2010,
at
C-1,
available
at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/02/24/BAVO1C6J7D.DTL.
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the justice system, and other detrimental externalities. Bryan
should provide the legal framework and the necessary incentive to
diminish, if not completely eliminate, improper police use of
Tasers.
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